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NRC INSPECTION MANUAL IOLB
 INSPECTION PROCEDURE 83501
SIGNIFICANT UNCONTROLLED RADIATION EXPOSURES
PROGRAM APPLICABILITY:  2515
83501-01 INSPECTION OBJECTIVE
To evaluate the licensee’s response to events that involved
significant uncontrolled radiation exposures of plant staff,
contractors, or visitors that resulted in or could have resulted in
the dose limits in 10 CFR Part 20 being exceeded. 
83501-02 INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS
02.01 Risk Assessment.  The inspector should perform the
following, if a significant uncontrolled exposure event occurred or
could have occurred.
a. Evaluate whether the licensee’s initial dose or risk estimate
is consistent with the known sequence of events.
b. Evaluate whether the licensee’s immediate response to the
event is commensurate with the initial risk estimate.
Consider whether the following actions are needed, and were
taken by the licensee as appropriate;
1.  Additional controls on source(s) of exposure/intake.
2. Medical screening or treatment of involved individual(s).
3. Stop work to limit additional risk to other individuals.
4. In-vivo or in-vitro bioassay for those events that
involve or may involve significant intakes of radioactive
material.
5. Evaluation to determine if other individuals may have
been exposed to radiation source(s).
02.02 Event Reconstruction.  Evaluate whether the licensee’s
understanding of the event is supported by the facts.  Evaluate
whether assumptions made concerning the sequence of events (i.e.,
exposure, proximity to the source, time interval, etc.) are
reasonably conservative and are supported by the logical extension
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02.03 Significance Determination.  In light of the findings
from the above, determine if the significance of the event(s) has
been appropriately characterized. 
02.04 Root Causes and Corrective Actions.  Evaluate whether the
licensee has adequately determined the causes of the uncontrolled
exposure(s) and has instituted corrective actions sufficient to
prevent reoccurrence.
83501-03 INSPECTION GUIDANCE
General Guidance
This inspection procedure applies to situations where the licensee
has experienced one or more events involving the uncontrolled
exposure(s) of individual(s) at the site that resulted in, or had
a substantial potential for, personnel exposures in excess of
regulatory limits.  This procedure does not address unintended
exposures that only have a significant impact on collective dose
and not individual dose .  As discussed below, necessary licensee
actions can be time sensitive.  Nothing in this procedure should be
interpreted as limiting or interfering with the licensee’s ability
to take those actions the licensee deems necessary to preclude
additional exposures from, mitigate the health impact of, or
properly characterize the consequences of, the exposure event.
Specific Guidance
03.01 Risk Assessment
In cases of serious radiation exposures, immediate licensee actions
necessary to minimize the health impact may be warranted or
prudent.  These actions may include medical examination and
intervention for individuals that have received doses from external
sources several times the dose limits.  In addition to the early
medical considerations, the need to initiate prompt in-vivo or in-
vitro bioassay (for significant intakes) should be evaluated.
These are judgement calls by the licensee usually made early in the
event, and may be based on incomplete information.  Inspector
review of these actions may start prior to arriving at the site,
(e.g., telephone discussions with the licensee).
Verify that the licensee’s methods of quantifying the dose, such as
time and motion studies, classification of radionuclide
transportability, and intake dose factors, are complete and
appropriate for the exposure situation.  For example, verify;
whether the licensee has contacted and interviewed all individuals
who may have been exposed during the event or during previously
undetected instances, whether all potential intakes of radioactive
materials or dose pathways have been considered, and whether the
licensee has fully evaluated the source term (e.g., unidentified
pure beta or alpha emitters) for purposes of dose  calculation.  If
the licensee is focused on whole body effective dose (TEDE), verify
whether a different dose limit (i.e., fetal dose or extremity dose)
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The risk assessment should review all appropriate or reasonable
outcomes as well as the actual consequences (dose) of the event.
For example, uncontrolled exposure events in Very High Radiation
Areas could result in life threatening exposures.
03.02 Event Reconstruction
Uncontrolled exposure events are typically identified after the
event by alarming electronic dosimeters, results of TLD dosimeter
processing, access point monitor alarms, or other actions, and
require reconstruction of the event to model the exposure condition
and doses received.  In addition, the initial risk or dose
assessment made by the licensee is followed by a more thorough
review of the event.
The licensee’s investigation of the event(s) may be ongoing during
this inspection.  Additional information, as it becomes available,
should be evaluated in terms of impact on the initial risk
assessment.  Notwithstanding, the inspector should conduct
sufficient independent review to evaluate the reasonableness of the
exposure circumstances and dose evaluation.  The review may include
interviews of exposed individuals.
Assumptions concerning the course of the event and the related risk
assessment should be directly supported by verifiable facts.  In
some cases, a time and motion re-enactment of the event can verify
or quantify the sequence of events.
For exposure events involving uncontrolled intakes at plants with
poor fuel performance, determine whether the licensee has
considered the potential for intakes of transuranic and other hard-
to-measure radionuclides.  The inspector should evaluate the
adequacy of the licensee characterization of the intake source term
by reviewing results of independent analyses made by the licensee
including 10 CFR Part 61 analyses of waste streams.  In addition,
intake assessments may be complicated by specific characteristics
of the in-vivo counters.  For example, the following questions
should be considered: Does the licensee’s whole body counter treat
the intake as total body or organ specific?  For the in-vitro
analyses, are samples being analyzed for the appropriate excretion
pathway?  Are analyses of lower limits of detection (LLDs)
appropriate?  Specifically, are the LLDs sufficiently low enough to
detect the specific radionuclide of importance and thus be useful
in providing a meaningful indication of excretion rate for purposes
of intake determination?
For external exposure events, the inspector should evaluate the
characterization of the source term and the adequacy of the
instrumentation/dosimetry used to evaluate or measure the dose.
Note that underwater exposure events may involve significant dose
determination problems including potential changes of energy of
radiation.
03.03 Significance Determination
An event presents a substantial potential for overexposure when it
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limits of 10 CFR Part 20.  The concern is not the significance of
the actual resulting (or potential) exposure, but whether the
licensee exercised adequate control over the situation, as
required, to prevent exceeding the 10 CFR Part 20 limits.
When evaluating whether an exposure event could have a substantial
potential for overexposure, the inspector should attempt to
construct a reasonable scenario in which a minor alteration of
circumstances would have resulted in a violation of 10 CFR Part 20
limits.  Circumstances such as (a) timing, (b) source strength, (c)
distance, and (d) shielding should be considered.
a. Timing:  Could the exposure period have reasonably been
longer?
Example: An individual in the proximity of an unknown
source of radiation receives an unplanned excessive exposure.
Because of the duration of the exposure, no limits were
exceeded; however, the individual could reasonably have
stayed in proximity to the source long enough to be
overexposed.
b. Source Strength:  Could the radiation source have reasonably
been stronger?
Example: An inadvertent release results from a worker
venting the wrong waste gas decay tank.  Although the release
did not exceed Part 20 limits, the same mistake could have as
easily resulted in venting a decay tank with enough activity
to exceed the limits.
c. Distance: Could the person have reasonably been closer to
the source?
Example:  In the example in paragraph (a) above, the
individual could have been overexposed by standing closer to
the source of radiation.
d. Shielding: Could some unintended shielding have reasonably
been removed?
Example: A radioactive source was accidently left in an
office area.  Shielding afforded by a desk prevented the
overexposure of an individual worker in the office.  However,
nothing prevented the source from being left in an area of
the office that would not have been shielded by the desk,
such that the individual would likely have been overexposed.
03.04 Root Causes and Corrective Actions
Verify that the licensee directed sufficient management attention
to the event to evaluate its significance.  Verify that the
licensee has provided reasonable assurance that the root causes
have been identified and that corrective actions have been taken to
prevent reoccurrence of the event.  Note,  in some cases, the
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action can be implemented.  The licensee may establish and
implement immediate, interim, and long-term corrective actions.
Experience has shown that uncontrolled exposures have resulted from
one or more of the following:
a. Poor hazards evaluation, including failure to survey or
inappropriate surveys.
b.  Inadequate instructions to the workers, including incomplete
requirements or briefings.
c.  Poor response to changing conditions by the Health Physics
coverage.
d.  Failure to follow procedures.
e.  Lack of Supervisory involvement.
f.  Lack of Management support.
g. Lack of effective communication between departments (e.g.,
radiation protection and operations).
These areas may be interrelated: any one of them may be a symptom
of a deeper underlying cause.  For example, the chronic failure to
follow procedures or inadequate corrective actions for similar
previous problems may be symptoms of lack of management support for
the Radiation Protection Program and/or insufficient involvement in
work activities by the first line supervisors.
83501-04 RESOURCE ESTIMATES
It is estimated that approximately 25-35 hours will be needed to
complete the requirements of this procedure.
83501-05 REFERENCES
NUREG/CR 4884, “Interpretation of Bioassay Measurements”
Regulatory Guide 8.9, “Acceptable Concepts, Models, Equations, and
Assumptions for a Bioassay Program”
Regulatory Guide 8.26, “Application of Bioassay for Fission and
Activation Products”
Regulatory Guide 8.34, “Monitoring Criteria and Methods to
Calculate Occupational Radiation Doses”
Regulatory Guide 8.38, “Control of Access to High and Very High
Radiation Areas of Nuclear Plants”
NUREG/BR-0195, “NRC Enforcement Manual” (definition of substantial
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